Introduction
Confronted with the deepest economic and political crisis of the EU since its inception, The Fiscal compact requires ratifying member states to enact laws, preferably of a constitutional nature, requiring national budgets to be in balance or in surplus. The treaty defines a balanced budget as one which has a general budget deficit less than 3% of GDP and a structural deficit of less than either 0.5% or 1%, depending on a countries debt-to-GDP ratio. The aim of this "golden rule" of balanced budgets is to ensure budgetary discipline among the EU governments. Another element of the Fiscal compact is so called "debt brake" modeled upon the German constitutional provision requiring the federal government to reduce its structural deficit to 0.35 % of GDP by 2016. The treaty also places compliance with its budgetary and other requirements under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
not decline sufficiently to prevent debt-to-GDP ratios from increasing, as the denominator in these rations (GDP) goes down faster than the numerator (the debt level). Thus, the effect of generalised austerity is recession and more unsustainable levels of government debt. Generalised austerity undermines the confidence of financial markets, because it leads the eurozone straight into a recession. 6 As we shall present in our analysis, the adopted fiscal compact cements the deeply flawed European direction. Failing to address the real causes of the euro zone crisis and to offer adequate economic solutions to the crisis, it could only plunge the EU into a deeper and prolonged economic depression. We argue that an alternative economic and political strategy is needed. At the moment, the destiny of the Fiscal compact seems to be in the judicial hands. Next month, the German Constitutional Court is expected to rule on the constitutionality of the compact. The Left Party (die Linke) together with 35.000 citizens supporting the More Democracy movement in their legal challenge argue that the Fiscal compact transfers powers to Brussels without democratic control and therefore violates the basic principle of parliamentary sovereignity of the German constitution. Prominent German legal scholars expect that the Court may use this opportunity to suggest a national referendum is held before budget sovereignity is transferred to EU institutions. 8 That the Fiscal compact is losing its political momentum is also apparent from some recent political initiatives which question the core premises of the Fiscal compact. Emile Roemer, the leader of the Dutch Socialists, the party leading opinion polls ahead of the next month general elections, announced that his party would demand a referendum on the EU Fiscal compact. He also mentioned that his party will resist the Fiscal compact. Ed Miliband, the leader of the British Labor party, after meeting Hollande, acknowledged that the tide was turning against austerity with Hollande in power.
The following analysis is divided into an economic discussion and a legal analysis of the Fiscal compact. We conclude with the list of alternative proposals to the EU Fiscal compact.
The economics of the Fiscal compact: too rigid and too restrictive
Contrary to its declared goals, the Fiscal compact shows that it does not lead to good fiscal policy. It tries to secure the moderate and sustainable levels of public debt at the levels of the national government. Such a declared goal is reasonable and legitimate. However, the problem is that legally binding limits imposed by the Fiscal compact are too rigid and too restrictive to allow such a reasonable fiscal policy. Karl Whelan from the University College Dublin analyzed the so-called golden rule. Despite the desirability of achieving moderate and sustainable levels of public debt and the need to return the country's debt to a 60 percent debtto-GDP ratio, he concluded that the rule "[being] far from golden, is a poor one that does not correspond to either of the principles of good fiscal policy-it cannot guide an economy towards a moderate and sustainable level of public debt and it cannot keep public debt fluctuating around this moderate level in a countercyclical fashion."
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Whelan puts forth the following argument: If the rule on long-run debt levels is followed, it will lead to debt ratios that fall well below those considered sustainable and moderate. An Ibid. His calculation is as follows: "For example, a deficit of 2.4 percent per year would, over time, stabilise the debt-GDP ratio at 60percent in an economy in which nominal GDP grew at an average 4 percent pace. Cyclical deviations of 2 or 3 percentage points around such an average deficit of 2.4 percent would also be possible without endangering fiscal stability. However, the 3percent maximum deficit rule severely limits the ability to run countercyclical policies of this type that would still be consistent with moderate levels of debt." large parts of the EU into a new recession in the near future. The outlook of most of the EU countries, including core countries, is not optimistic.
The European Macro Group provided further analysis of the adopted Fiscal compactnamely, the requirement to balance the budgets or secure their surplus and ensure that the structural deficits will remain below 0.5 percent of gross domestic product, with the European Court of Justice empowered to verify whether this rule is obeyed, is deeply questionable.
Countries exhibiting deficits will have to reduce them rapidly; countries whose debt ratio The European Macro Group's joint study reminds us of the arbitrariness of the target of a debt ratio of 60 percent. This figure was invented as part of the Maastricht criteria and was justified under the assumption that a nominal GDP would grow by 5 percent per annum in the medium to long run.
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The fundamental flaw of the debt criterion of the Fiscal compact according to the European Macro Group's study is that no differentiation exists between government debt accumulated for cyclical reasons and government debt accumulated for other ("structural") reasons.
13 12 In this case, the government ratio converges toward 60 percent even if the budget deficit permanently reaches the Maastricht limit of 3 percent. In reality, the nominal GDP of 11 countries has increased by only 3.5 percent per year since 1992. This fact would require significant changes of the targets-a maximum target for the government debt ratio of about 86 percent. Moreover, if the overall deficit is to be limited to 0. There is no sound economic reason to back up such a rule. Governments invest in infrastructure, human capital, the environment, and the law and order. All these investments increase the productive capacity of a nation. There is no reason for governments to be prohibited from issuing debt to finance these investments. In much the same way as there is no reason to prohibit firms that invest productively to issue debt. In fact, economic theory tells us that governments that invest productively should issue debt to finance these investments. Productive investments profit present and future generations. It is therefore desirable to spread the cost of these investments over present and future generations…. What should be avoided is unsustainable debt, not debt per se.
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The Fiscal compact, in combination with synchronized austerity measures, has contributed 16 to the EU's recession and long-term stagnation and has not brought about improvements to the quality of fiscal policies across the EU. It is poorly designed, with many internal contradictions, and will inevitably become a source of new conflicts and divisions in the EU. As such, it is closer to the economic philosophy put forth by Herbert Hoover and his idea of liquidating the "rottenness" from the markets.
However, this does not mean that many of the EU countries in the past decade have not committed numerous mistakes in the public and private sector; rather, the ongoing EU response to the crisis, based on single-minded austerity and balanced budget, has further exacerbated the crisis. Many other crucial debates, such as how to reestablish links between local financial institutions and local business developments, how to address the EU's persistent current account balance and many other crucial strategic issues, are being ignored due to the EU's persistence in its austerity and balanced budget. It is a sign of a profound lack of ideas, initiatives and imagination, where the public discourse on how to move further in the EU is decisively missing.
Wrong diagnosis of public financial difficulties
Having provided an overview of the problems caused by the implementation of the Fiscal compact in the EU and referred to the equally problematic theoretical assumptions of the Fiscal compact, we now explore the reasons why the European leaders decided in the midst of the most severe financial, economic and social crisis to start disciplining and penalizing governments for their supposed profligacy. The reason stems from the diagnosis that the public financial difficulties, public debts and deficits are the consequence of the profligacy of governments prior to the financial crisis. There may have been elements of profligacy, to be sure. However, a more nuanced analysis of the last decade shows that all of the governments, with the exception of Greece, were disciplined with respect to public finances. Fallen revenues due to the recession, increased unemployment benefits and recapitalization of the financial institutions are among the main reasons for the deteriorating public financial position of the European governments. The fiscal trap of many European governments is a 18 "Those who say that it is government profligacy, that is the source of the debt crisis are mistaken. They also fail to see the inevitable connection between private and public debt. This connection is particularly strong in countries like Spain and Ireland that have been hit badly by the debt crisis. As can be seen from Figure 2 , Spain and Ireland were spectacularly successful in reducing their government debt to GDP ratios prior to the financial crisis-namely, Spain from 60 percent to 40 percent and Ireland from 43 percent to 23 percent. These were the two countries that followed the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact better than any other country-certainly better than Germany, which allowed its government debt ratio to increase before 2007. Yet the two countries, which followed the fire code regulations most scrupulously were hit by the fire because they failed to contain domestic private debt."
consequence-not a cause-of the financial crisis. It should be recognized and managed accordingly, not perceived as a main culprit and cause of the crisis.
Charles Wyplosz recommended a more decentralized approach to the fiscal consolidation. In addition to the discussion on the right diagnosis of the root causes underlying European imbalances and weak democratic accountability at the supranational-and often at the national-levels, an additional characteristic of the crisis and deep recession exists but has been overlooked. Such a phenomenon was widely analyzed and understood in previous crises (e.g., the Great Depression). Namely, all of the European economies are experiencing an ongoing complex process of deleveraging the public sector, households and companies.
Irwing Fisher noted during the Great Depression that it is not possible to achieve a deleveraging of both the public and private sectors simultaneously. Attempts to deleverage both sectors simultaneously can damage the economy as a whole. The private sector can only reduce its debt if the government is willing to increase its own debt. Otherwise, negative dynamics are created that can pull the economy down into deflation. In the literature, this phenomenon is known as the Fisher paradox. 
The false idea of expansionary austerity
The next argument in favor of adopting the Fiscal compact stems from the conviction that the best solution to the public financial crisis and recovery is the implementation of austerity measures. Tough austerity measures would calm the financial markets and investors because new stability would be established, encouraging new investments due to the reduced risks in the markets.
Such an assumption about establishing the market and investors' confidence is based on tough The problem with the assumption about newly established confidence based on expansionary austerity is that it has very little support in empirical studies to date. The general effect of the measures across Europe is that the budget deficits do not decrease fast enough to prevent the deterioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio because the GPD is falling faster than the public debt.
In this context, austerity measures do not establish the necessary confidence of the financial markets, but rather further undermine confidence. The answer of the European leaders in this context is that we need more austerity instead of measures and policies to stimulate jobs and growth. This economic philosophy again resembles Hoover's economic philosophy. Despite the empirical fact that the European policy is pushing more and more member states and their regions into a deep recession, resulting in high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth, European economic policies remain largely unchanged.
Empirical studies indicating that expansionary austerity has a very poor record remain Based on these empirical facts and extensive research, IMF director Christine Lagarde, a former French finance minister, warned her former colleagues-namely, the European finance ministers-that slamming on the fiscal brakes too strongly might have negative impacts on the employment outlook and general economic recovery. 22 More important than implementing one-sided and unbalanced measures is the need to try to achieve fiscal consolidation in the medium run while simultaneously carrying out incentives to achieve economic growth and jobs.
Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhardt demonstrated that growth in the time of debt has no simple causal links as often presented in the context of European decision-making processes.
For example, they concluded that the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of the GDP. 23 No one is trying to claim that debt burden (public, private, domestic, foreign) is unimportant. The argument is much more subtle: Debt thresholds are country specific; where the "debt intolerance" begins is a much more contextual matter. Therefore, approaching the fiscal consolidation on a more decentralized and medium-term basis, where other important macroeconomic aggregates and circumstances are taken into account, sounds like a more consistent approach to the crisis than the one-size-fits-all approach currently adopted in the EU.
The impression is that the European leaders encountered the financial and economic crisis unprepared. More often than not, they adopted the decisions in haste and under the huge pressure of the crisis unfolding before them. It is difficult to understand and explain why European leaders are unwilling to adhere to these more subtle recommendations. It is perhaps due to the superficial analysis of the nature and extent of the crisis or the misperception that the crisis is not only financial but also related to the real economy in the majority of the European regions. The weak and largely ill-conceived response to the crisis can also reflect the EU democratic deficit, which means that a large part of the European population remains excluded from the discussions, unable to articulate their ideas and initiatives or express their concerns and needs. This is the point where the weak development of the European constitutional democracy comes in with full importance.
Poor understanding of the role and importance of public debt
Advocates of fiscal realism, in the absence of strong normative, doctrinal and empirical arguments, prefer to use a very simplistic but seemingly convincing household logic: What holds for households also holds for national economies. However, they tend to forget that the national economy consists of many households in different situations. Some households are saving while others are taking out loans for various purposes. The same is true for other actors in the national economies: Some companies invest and grow, start-up companies take on debts to develop, and others are saving their corporate profits. Thus, to take the household logic to the aggregate level is misleading.
Paul Krugman conducted a historic analysis of the British public debt, pointing out that British public debt exceeded 100 percent of the country's GDP in 81 of the last 170 years.
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High levels of debts during various historic periods did not prevent Britain from developing and growing nor from repaying all of its commitments; they certainly did not The issue of the public debt, public assets, deficits and public finances is in truth a much more complex issue than recognized by the Fiscal compact. This is particularly evident in the historic example of the United States, which emerged from World War II with a high level of public debt. This high public debt did not present an additional burden for the taxpayers because of the high growth rates and subsequent high tax revenues. According to Krugman, the debt from the war was never repaid, it just became increasingly irrelevant as the American economy grew and, with it, the income subject to taxation. As long as the government can ensure that the tax base grows faster than debt, the debt remains in control. shown that public debts are an integral part of modern democratic societies. They represent one of the instruments for securing the long-term development of societies. As long as total output grows, the public debt can also grow steadily because it serves the purposes connected with growth. If issues such as the structure of production, development of international economy, the careful design of the tax and expenditure structures are dealt with carefully and deliberately, then the issue of debt burden can be also dealt with successfully. In such a case, public debts and deficits are not part of the problem; they are part of the solution.
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Opting for public debt is sensible and justified because the public sphere, similar to the private sphere, contributes to economic growth. Public investments can even make a vital contribution to the economic development inasmuch they provide the necessary and adequate infrastructure, provide investments in education and training and support and participate in overall social development. 28 Economic growth and social development would suffer if modern societies were unable to provide resources for public investments. low levels to the earlier levels. 29 Of course, such findings do not directly apply to many of the EU countries and regions, but they do suggest the need to pause for a second before cutting public investments on behalf of indiscriminatory austerity measures.
Two other important questions have emerged with respect to the issue of public debts and deficits and the often-mentioned arguments. These questions relate to the crowding out effect and the living beyond our means argument. The crowding out effect relates to the argument that the overly extensive amount of public spending and public investments suppresses private economic activity and private investments, thereby reducing the overall well-being of society.
Similarly, the living beyond our means argument states that the government should not be incurring public debts so as not to disproportionately burden future generations.
If the crowding out argument holds, we would expect the countries with the worst public performance to show the largest rise in interest rates while the countries with the best public debt performance would show the smallest rise. Yet an empirical study of seven industrial countries ranked by increases in public debt and real interest rates in government bonds indicated that no significant correlation existed between interest rate changes and growth in public debt. Other important factors that are not fixed affected the identified relationship, such as domestic saving rates, balance of trade and monetary policy. As this study demonstrated, relating public debt to interest is a much more complex and mutually dependent issue then the proponents of the crowding out effect claim.
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The debate on the crowding out effect carries with it another important dimension-namely, the dilemma put forward by Heilbroner and Bernstein: Should private spending always have priority over public spending? Some public investments with small initial return provide very positive effects for the national economy while some investments with vast profits have no positive effects on the national economy. This debate is connected with the importance and role of the public sector and with a broader debate on the overall national strategies of development. 31 Of course, no one is claiming that there cannot be failed public and/or private investments as we can encounter them in both developed and developing parts of the world. The argument of living beyond our means is similar to the crowding out effect. This argument applies to a country that does not generate enough savings to be able to support its own capital investment. 32 In the United States, which is well known for its "twin deficits"-budget deficit and trade deficit-the balancing of the budget would improve the shortage of savings only on the unlikely supposition that consumers and business firms made absolutely no changes in their decisions to spend, save and invest despite lower government revenues and higher taxes.
In other situations, the economic growth would suffer even more than in the case of cutting back the private needs due to the failure to provide for public capital needs. 33 This is the reason why Heilbroner and Bernstein recommended an increase of public investments financed by borrowing: A deficit used for public capital formation is the best way to raise household and business income and, as a result, their savings. Deficits used for investment do not "absorb" savings, but rather generate savings.
34
This discussion of the public debt and deficit in terms of public and private investments and savings in the American context illustrates the complex relation between the public and private sectors and between the government and the market. The discussion indicates that it is not possible to simply determine in advance certain numerical limits that define sustainable public debt and deficit as well as positive and negative consequences for the economy and society.
The risk of unsustainable public finance cannot be underestimated. For small, open economies sharing the fate of the common monetary area, such a caution is even more necessary.
However, such awareness does not mean that we should indiscriminately, immediately and deeply cut public expenditures, especially growth-relating public expenditures. Quality of financial cuts matters more than quantity. This is often forgotten in the European context and further reinforced with the numerical limits determined by the Fiscal compact and other fiscal rules. These rules are too intrusive; they go too far and are part of the problem, not part of the solution for high-quality and transparent fiscal policy. It would be economically and socially unacceptable to cut investments that support growth, employment and all other forms of more inclusive, more balanced future developments. Some of the most competitive European societies and regions also maintain the highest levels of social cohesiveness.
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Competitiveness and social cohesiveness go hand in hand. This is of equal importance in the context of achieving a high-quality and sustainable system of public finance.
Legal issues of the Fiscal compact
So far we have argued that the Fiscal compact constitutionalizes a wrong economic policy. In this section we try to show that it is also deficient from a legal perspective. have actually deteriorated because their GDPs fell even more rapidly than they were able to reduce their public debt. The Eurozone and EU are experiencing the highest levels of unemployment in their histories, and the outlook for the labor market remains bleak.
The EU could and should do better than that. First and foremost, the fiscal compact rules should be tailored less rigidly. The approach to fiscal consolidation should be implemented in a more decentralized way. It should be pursued as a medium-term goal and in close relation to economic recovery based on socially inclusive growth in each of the member states. The critics of the decentralized approach toward fiscal consolidation would undoubtedly reject such an approach based on member state governments' lack of credibility in sticking to identified goals. Yet mutual trust and credibility are vital elements of any integration and any coordination of economic, social and political matters. We are of the opinion that the member states and their governments are in principal trustworthy partners. Moreover, in order to successfully pursue fiscal consolidation, the participation of social partners, local and regional governments, and independent civil society is crucial as all of them have stakes in the process of fiscal consolidation. As such, fiscal consolidation should be implemented using a more decentralized approach.
Instead of one single model of fiscal consolidation, pursued from the top down and on the basis of a one-size-fits-all approach, we should apply a more differentiated and nuanced approach. It may appear to be a more complicated model, but it may be better suited for different fiscal, financial and other social characteristics of each of the member states. In addition to the substantially revised and improved rules on fiscal consolidation, the debate on the importance and role of financial institutions in the EU should follow. The inconvenient truth about Europe's financial sector in its present form is that it has become bloated and dysfunctional. In its current form, it does not represent support for the real economy, but a drain on it. The understanding of the role of financial institutions is a crucial point of the European crisis debate. Propping up the entire European financial sector without questioning to what extent it is capable of supporting and lending to the real sector is highly problematic.
When the last banking loan scheme-in the amount of one trillion euros to the European …most of that debt growth has NOT been due to lending to the real sector-to nonfinancial firms, supporting growth in wages and profit. Almost all of it was due to mortgage lending and to credit to the nonbank financial sector credit, to inflate stocks and property prices and to create and trade options, futures, and other derivative instruments…. 44 The distinction between the socially useful financial activities and trading activities within the financial sector, both banking and non-banking, deserves more attention. Contrary to conventional wisdom, money used for the exchange of positions between financial institutions provides very little and only episodic links with the real economy. Short-term portfolio investments have dominated long-term investments in productive capacities.
Thus, the real challenge for policymakers is determining how to re-establish links between the financial institutions and the real economy. In its current form, financial institutions present very little importance for the real economy in good economic times; during periods of financial crisis, they represent a threat to the real economy and society at large. The challenge is to restructure financial institutions in such a way as to turn them from bad masters to good servants to provide the necessary support for economic and social activities.
Small local and regional networks of banks are generally more supportive of local and regional economic development than large concentrations of finance. Any rescue of the financial sector should be carried out only to the extent that these financial intuitions can provide long-term capital for the productive investments. New financial institutions capable of tightening the links between savings and productive investments can be envisaged, including public venture capital funds. More policy space is necessary at all levels of EU polity.
Finally, if countless billions were found for propping up large European financial institutions, it would be equally helpful to find a small fraction of this money for the support of education and research, as well to retrain and reskill European citizens.
The EU is not lacking financial resources, but rather ideas about how to create more inclusive, diverse and pluralistic European societies and economies. The future of the EU will be determined by the ability of the European civil society to articulate and push forward alternative possibilities and alternative futures.
